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An abundance of violence and scarcity of words 
Sandra F. Joireman 
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It is hard to avoid knowing something about the conflict in Darfur.  There are divestment 
movements, student campaigns, actors raising awareness and the ‘genocide olympics’ to 
remind us of the ongoing conflict.  There is also an increasingly ugly exchange in which 
two sides are talking and neither is listening. This exchange is not between the 
combatants, as one might expect, but among activists and scholars who disagree on the 
best way to portray the conflict.   While it is difficult to avoid knowing something about 
the violence in Darfur, finding a deeper analysis that goes beyond the attempts to gain 
attention and muster moral outrage is not easy.  Two of the books reviewed here do much 
to fill this gap by providing rich historical background and resources regarding the 
political makeup of the area for those who want to know more about the conflict in 
Darfur.   Prunier offers a detailed history of the Darfur region from the time of the Fur 
Sultanate (late 1600s) forward.  The book situates Darfur domestically and within 
regional politics involving Chad and Libya.  De Waal’s edited volume provides a forum 
for voices from Europe and Sudan with a variety of foci but a unifying theme that what is 
happening in Darfur is a political conflict with specific historical causes.  The third book, 
a compilation by Furley and May, addresses many of the other conflicts in Africa that 
have not yet reached the point of being labeled genocide.   
 
Historically, Darfur has been marginalized, never reaching a level of importance to the 
Khartoum government.   In North Darfur most Arab pastoralists are landless because they 
did not receive any rangeland when much of the customary land tenure system of hakura 
was established in the 18th century.  When drought came in 1984 ‘Arabs’ moved their 
herds into new territory in central and Southern Darfur, coming into conflict with 
farmers.   Drought exacerbated the problems of land allocation and property rights which 
have been central to the African-Arab cleavage in Darfur.  A lack of government 
intervention led to famine and a massive displacement of people as both farmers and 
nomads left their traditional areas in search of food for themselves and for their animals.  
Libya, seeking a foothold in Darfur, took advantage of this crisis and began arming the 
Baggara Arabs, a landless group of Chadian origins that had crossed over into Sudan.   In 
arming the Baggara Arabs the Libyans introduced more weapons to the area than had 
previously been available, made an overt grab for territory and challenging the authority 
of the Sudanese state.  At that time the state did not respond.   
 
By the early 1990s, Arab identity became associated with pastoralism and African with 
settled agriculture, with corresponding political connotations as the ‘Arabs’ were 
associated with the Khartoum elite in a type of cooptation of the Arab identity and 
aspirations to power (Prunier 40).  Labels of Arab and African are defined uniquely in the 
Darfur context; they are not based on physiognomic characteristics such as skin color.  
An illustration of this is present in the documentary, The Devil Came on Horseback, a 
film of Brian Seidle’s experience in Darfur with the African Mission In Sudan.  In the 
film Seidle interviews with ‘Arab’ members of the jajawiid militia who have black skin.  
Jérôme Tubiana, writing in the de Waal volume goes further in noting that the Arab-
African divide is not based on skin color, religion or culture, and not even on livelihood, 
as there are non-Arab herders as well as Arab farmers in Darfur.  Tubiana argues that 
Arab identity is entirely constructed and can be understood as a claim to membership in 
the ruling group.  For Tubiana and others writing in the de Waal volume, the conflict in 
Darfur is a struggle between those who have land and those who do not in a marginalized 




Both of the books on Darfur question the use of the word genocide in application to 
Darfur.  They are not the first or the only ones to raise this issue.  Mahmood Mamdani 
has publicly wondered about the appellation of the conflict in Darfur as genocide, while 
Iraq’s conflict, which exhibits similar characteristics, is labeled an insurgency (Mamdani 
2007). Calling the violence in Darfur ‘genocide’ requires identifying the targeted group 
and proving that it is targeted because of ethnicity, religion or race. Questioning the 
simplistic explanation that ‘Arabs’ are killing ‘Africans’, both Prunier and de Waal argue 
that the lines between ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ are not clear historically and are easily 
traversed.   
 
Prunier refers to Darfur as an ambiguous genocide, qualifying the label by noting that 
while violence in Darfur may meet the standards of the 1948 Genocide Convention, it 
does not look like what we saw in Rwanda or the Holocaust - the attempt to totally 
eliminate an ethnic or religious group.  Darfur lacks both a clearly distinguishable ethnic 
group and the meticulous planning of previous genocides.  One can see his struggle over 
definition in the following statement. 
 
“The practice of genocide or quasi-genocide in Sudan has never been a 
deliberate well thought-out policy but rather a spontaneous tool used for 
keeping together a ‘country’ which is under minority Arab domination and 
which is in fact one of the last  multi-national empires on the planet.”  
(Prunier 105).    
 
While Prunier uses the term ‘ambiguous genocide’, De Waal eschews the term 
‘genocide’ altogether, calling the conflict in Darfur a war and provides a deep and 
detailed context for the conflict by examining land holding patterns, local governance, the 
genesis of the various armed factions and attempts at resolution.  De Waal has come 
under harsh attack for his questioning of the use of the word genocide.  John Prendergast 
of the Enough Project attacks de Waal in a debate on Newsweek’s website for not 
embracing the term with the lower standards of the genocide convention and he accuses 
him of parroting the rhetoric of the Government of Sudan and ignoring the targeting of 
ethnic groups (De Waal and Prendergast 2007).  The Genocide Convention defines 
genocide as the targeting “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group (Genocide Convention 1948).”  Prendergast argues that the 
violence in Darfur meets the standards of the 1948 Genocide Convention and considers 
any other term not only inappropriate, but also irresponsible.   
 
Genocide is the term that evokes outrage appropriate to the targeting of civilians in 
Darfur.  But this sort of targeting of civilians occurs in multiple contexts around the 
world, not all of which are genocides.  For example, violence in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo has killed millions of people, the majority of whom are civilians, yet this 
conflict receives much less attention.  Prendergast agrees with Samantha Power, that we 
should be prompt to call conflicts genocides in order to overcome barriers to external 
intervention and actually protect the lives of civilians (Power 2003).  Yet, use of the word 
genocide by both governments and activists with regard to Darfur has not led to the 
desired immediate and significant response.   
 
The debate on terminology will be resurrected by events subsequent to the writing of 
these books.  The Justice and Equality Movement, one of the contingent of Darfur 
insurgent groups, has launched attacks in the suburbs of Khartoum.  Hassan al-Turabi, the 
movement’s most powerful supporter, was put under house arrest and the government of 
Sudan has been lobbying to have the JEM listed as a terrorist organization.  These events 
all give context to the issue of labeling. JEM would view themselves as freedom fighters 
and as responding to genocide while the government would call them terrorists.  
 
 
Getting the Language Right 
Darfur is an example of a larger problem.  We need better language to describe both the 
violence that we see around the world and its origins.   Many conflicts do not meet the 
definition of genocide yet result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands or even millions 
of people. The targeting of civilians in postmodern wars with a variety of strategies and 
causes has complicated the articulation of both conflict and response.  In Africa’s Wars, 
Oliver Furley and Roy May decry the lack of adequate language to distinguish intrastate 
war from coups, genocides and organized crime.  They even note the fuzziness of 
definitions of civil wars - a striking irony given that the measures we have for the 
presence of civil wars are more clearly established than for other types of conflict 
(Sambanis and Collier 2005).  Conversely, we also refer to conflicts as genocides when 
they do not fit nicely into the definition of the genocide convention.  The Cambodian 
genocide is one example.  It began with the targeting of the so-called ‘new’ people, or 
urban dwellers and only later expanded to include the Vietnamese and the Cham.  
Although the violence eliminated around 50% of the Cambodian population it does not fit 
the convention’s definition of genocide unless we start to call the ‘new’ people an ethnic 
group, which is certainly not how they conceived of themselves.    
 
Richard Jackson writing in the Furley and May volume blames theoretical models for 
contributing to the language problem, arguing that commentators caught in a neorealist 
framework are unable to identify orthodox warfare techniques and strategies when they 
are used in conflicts that have been labeled ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’.  Perhaps there is some 
solution in the language of “Crimes against Humanity” used by the International Criminal 
Court.  The term is sufficiently dire without some of the definitional difficulties of 
genocide.   
 
While there is a poverty of our language with regard to violence, that of guilt attribution 
is far richer. Freedom fighter, revolutionary and terrorist all refer to the same person 
depending on one’s perspective.  Those familiar with Rwanda are aware of the way in 
which language is used to describe what happened there in 1994 with Tutsis referring to 
‘the genocide’ and Hutus situating it in a wider context and calling it ‘the war’.   Calling 
it ‘the war’ blurs the edges of its horror, intentionally so in language used by the group 
that carries the blame as perpetrators.  Genocide attributes guilt and demands a response 
in a way that ethnic conflict, insurgency or even war do not.  But what if genocide is not 
completely accurate?  Should it be used anyway? 
 
 
Public interest verses accuracy 
There appears to be a tradeoff between public interest in a crisis and accuracy.  If we 
believe accounts from experts, it is not entirely correct to say that people are being 
targeted for death in Darfur because of ethnicity or race.  Does it matter?  Invoking 
genocide provides far more energy in advocacy than an examination of a complex history 
of political neglect coupled with a resource conflict over land.  How many countries can 
we name in which resource scarcity and a lack of representation feed off of one another 
until they ultimately result in armed conflict of some sort: DRC, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka. 
Perhaps this too, needs its own label. 
 
In the case of extreme violence against civilians, as has been occurring in Darfur, it 
appears that we should err on the side of caution and use the most extreme descriptors of 
violence which we have.  Yet, use of this language may impede adequate solutions to 
complex problems.  In the case of Darfur, if the intent was genocide in the way Prunier 
discusses it, as total obliteration of a group (as opposed to the looser definition of the 
Genocide Convention), then this suggests three different options to bring about an end to 
extreme violence against civilians. One option would be a program of mass re-education 
of the population which draws attention to the historically variable nature of ethnic 
difference in Darfur, and promotes greater mutual understanding of difference in the 
present. Another option would be external military intervention to act as a neutral arbiter 
and regulate interactions between the warring factions. A third option would be the 
partition of Darfur and forced resettlement into ethnically homogeneous regions. None of 
these options seems particularly feasible or, in the latter case at least, ethically desirable. 
If the violence is, however, genocidal then there is a compelling case for one of these 
options, regardless of their feasibility. The texts reviewed here, however, suggest that the 
underlying issues are conflicts over land and democratic representation. This suggests 
that it is possible to bring an end to extreme violence against civilians, but only if the 
underlying issues of political representation and land reform are dealt with. In the case of 
Darfur there are calls for dealing with these underlying issues as a way forward. The 
Enough Project brief on Abyei, after violence there in May 2008, calls for all who care 
about Sudan to consider the interests of the entire country, the conflict in Abyei and the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as the context in which a 
solution to the violence in Darfur could be reached (Winter 2008).  This suggests that a 
resolution of the underlying issues is necessary in order to ensure long-term peace.   
 
   
A call to scholarship 
 
When the argument over what to call Darfur’s conflict is over and attention to the area 
wanes, students, activists and policy makers will move on.  Indeed, some have already 
done so.  We have learned from Darfur that calling a conflict genocide does not lead to 
the immediate intervention called for in the Genocide Convention.  Yet, scholars should 
take note.  A large contribution to the study of political violence could be made by the 
development of language to describe the types of postmodern warfare that we are seeing.  
Kaldor (1999) and others have helped us in developing a terminology for conflicts that 
target civilians, but the issues of intent and intensity of the conflicts have yet to be 
sufficiently labeled.    We should be concerned about violence against civilians and mass 
killings whether the intent is genocide, political retribution or territorial acquisition.  
Language frames how we understand conflicts and what we see as potential solutions.  
Language also frames the attribution of guilt.  Without specific definitions and language 
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